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NEC V. INTEL: A CHALLENGE TO THE
DEVELOPING LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN THE
PROTECTION OF COMPUTER
PROGRAMS
F. Thomas Dunlap, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Congress established that computer programs would be
protected by the copyright laws, the courts have been faced with the
challenge of pacing the development of the law with the burgeoning
technologies of computer science. Fortunately for continuing inno-
vation and investment, the courts have proven equal to the task.
Having conquered the intricacies of source code, object code, ROM,
PROM and EPROM, the court system recently found itself exam-
ining yet another facet of technology when, in December of 1984,
NEC filed suit against Intel Corporation for declaratory judgment
challenging the copyrightability of microcode (or microprograms, a
term used interchangeably with microcode).
The microprocessor is the driver of the modem day personal
computer, and microcode is the master that directs the micro-
processor. Microprograms interpret and convert high level instruc-
tions into microinstructions which the computer can understand.
The microcode itself is a computer program which can be stored in
a variety of media. The Intel microcode is embedded in Read Only
Memory (ROM) directly on the microprocessor. The use of
microcode enhances design efficiency, allowing microprocessor op-
erations to be directed by computer programs which are readily
changeable, rather than by hardware which can be costly and time
consuming to change or correct.
Although the suit which is the subject of this article was filed
in December, 1984, the story begins in April of 1978 when Intel
introduced its 8086/88 microprocessors. They were Intel's first 16-
bit microprocessors and the first to utilize microprograms. NEC
copied those products, including the copyrighted microprograms
Copyright © 1987 F. Thomas Dunlap, Jr. All Rights Reserved.
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4 COMPUTER & HIGH-TECHNOLOGYLAW JOURNAL
(bit-for-bit), and sold them as the uPD 8086 and uPD 8088
microprocessors. When Intel complained about NEC's use of In-
tel's copyrighted microprograms, the claim was settled without liti-
gation by a license agreement dated February 23, 1983.
The present suit arose out of a decision by NEC to attempt to
create its own series of microprocessors, the V-series, that did not
use Intel's microprograms (and thereby to avoid payment of royal-
ties). Intel's claim is that, while NEC succeeded in creating the sur-
face appearance of change in the V-series microprograms, they, in
fact, were copied and derived from Intel's microprograms.
NEC's complaint for declaratory judgment sets out a series of
"fire and fall back" positions. First NEC alleged that micro-
programs were not copyrightable. However, in the event that it was
wrong on that issue, it alleged that if Intel had copyrights in its
microprograms, the copyrights had been forfeited because some In-
tel licensees had failed to mark copyright notice on licensed prod-
ucts. In the event that a court should find that NEC was wrong on
both those issues, NEC alleged that its microprograms did not in-
fringe Intel's copyrights, or that if they did infringe, the infringe-
ment was required because there is only one way to write the
microprograms to perform the task which NEC desired to perform.
And finally - even if a court would find that microprograms are
copyrightable, that Intel's microprograms were validly copyrighted,
and that NEC copied the microprograms, although there was no
necessity to do so - NEC reserved two more fallback positions:
either NEC was licensed to copy the microprograms or Intel has
misused its copyrights so that they cannot be asserted against NEC.
Intel counterclaimed seeking an injunction prohibiting NEC
from infringing its copyrights any further, damages, and costs of
suit. After a two month bench trial before Judge William A.
Ingram of the U.S. District Court, Northern District of California,
the court ruled that "defendant and counterclaimant Intel Corpora-
tion has good, valid and existing copyright on its 8086/8088
microcode." The issues of damages and unfair competition were
each bifurcated for separate trials. The court has not yet ruled upon
the infringement issue.
As the court's partial decision reflects, the major issues in the
case can be grouped into three main categories:
(1) Is microcode copyrightable? The court has ruled that it is.
(2) Did Intel possess a valid copyright on its microprograms?
The court has ruled that Intel has valid and existing copyrights.
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(3) Did NEC infringe Intel's copyright? This issue is not yet
decided.
Each of these issues is considered separately below in the context of
Intel's position and the proof at trial.
II. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS
The fundamental issue of the copyrightability of computer pro-
grams has been well-settled by statute and by case law. Under the
1980 amendment to the Copyright Act, copyright protection was
explicitly affirmed with respect to computer programs, which were
defined as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 2
The case law has uniformly affirmed this protection for a variety of
computer programs, irrespective of their code level or embodi-
ment.3 As the district court in Formula emphasized:
It is crystal-clear that CONTU recommended that all computer
programs, fixed in any method and performing any function, be
included within copyright protection. There likewise can be no
doubt that Congress accepted that recommendation and embod-
ied it in the 1980 amendments to the copyright law.4
Since it is clearly established that computer programs in gen-
eral are protected under copyright, the task becomes one of demon-
strating that microcode meets the legal definition of a "computer
program."
A. The Copyrightability of Microcode: As a Computer
Program
Microprogramming, like other forms of computer program-
ming, enables a vast range of expressions to be adapted to the com-
puter. As with other computer programs, writing microprograms is
a creative process, usually beginning with a higher or English-like
language which is then translated into a machine-readable language
of l's and O's. Put in more conventional computer terms,
microprograms are written in source code and translated into object
code. As the court in the Intel case stated in its Findings of Fact,
"the methodology employed in the creation of microcode is indis-
2. 17 U.S.C § 101.
3. See, eg., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983); Apple Computer Int'l, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
4. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 781 (C.D. Cal 1983)
(emphasis by the court); aff'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
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tinguishable from that employed in the creation of any computer
program."
That finding is in large part based on the testimony of Hiroaki
Kaneko, the engineer who wrote the NEC microcode:
Q. ... Can you explain to the Court what microcode assembly
refers to?
A. Microprograms, as I have been referring to them up until
now, are source level microprograms and in order to incorporate
these source programs to actual chips, you have to transfer them
into binary patterns. And these binary patterns are what we call
object code. And the program that produces this object code is
what is called a microassembl[er].
[Tr. 1890:2-10 (Kaneko)]
Q. You create the source code, then the TACO assembler gen-
erates object code from the source code; right?
A. Yes.
[Tr. 2058:23-2059:1 (Kaneko)]
The debate does not end at this point, however. Once created,
microcode can be stored in a variety of media, such as paper, floppy
disks or semiconductor chips. Intel's microprograms were embed-
ded in ROM on the microprocessor chip, as are many computer
programs. NEC argued that due in part to this form of inscription,
the microprograms become a part of the hardware of the machine
and as such are subject to patent but not copyright protection. The
court in this dispute, however, followed the clear ruling in Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,' that a computer pro-
gram, even when embedded in a ROM chip, is copyrightable. The
court emphasized that the storage modality of a program does not
change the nature of the program.
Other NEC attempts to justify isolating microprograms from
other computer programs similarly failed. For example, NEC ar-
gued that microcode was distinguishable from other computer pro-
grams by the fact that often microcode is not accessible to the user,
but rather encoded in the chip before shipment to the customer. As
the court noted, however, some forms of microcode can be manipu-
lated, or even written, by the user.' By ruling in favor of copyright-
ability, the court implied that user accessibility is not a determinant
5. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1251 (3rd Cir.
1983).
6. Although the 8086 microcode is not normally "accessible" to the user, it is possible
to customize the microcode to suit a particular user's needs.
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of copyrightability. Had the court ruled that accessibility was a
barrier to copyrightability, the industry would have found itself
with two classifications of microcodes: those which are accessible
to the user and protected, and those which are not protected simply
because they are inaccessible to the user. The unworkability of such
a distinction is obvious.
Finally, protection of microcode was attacked on the ground
that microcode performs a different function than do other com-
puter programs. Microcode adds one step into the process of trans-
lating from quasi-English (the source code) into Os and ls (the
object code). However, this does not mean that a non-program
function has been added, but rather that a traditional function has
been subdivided and improved. Where there is no microcode, other
computer programs are converted directly into electrical control
signals and are utilized in the computer to implement the macroin-
structions (instructions that are available to the user); where there is
microcode, macroinstructions are interpreted by the microprograms
to lower level instructions. Microprograms thus bring about the
end result in the same manner as conventional programs. As the
Intel-NEC court concluded in its Partial Findings, "the control sig-
nals generated in a nonmicroprogrammed computer perform the
same kind of tasks generated in a microprogrammed computer."
Mr. Kaneko provided some of the supporting testimony:
Q. In the 8086/8088, there are some macroinstructions which
directly control the hardware?
A. Yes. I am aware that such macroinstructions do exist.
Q. So, in the 8086, the control structure sometimes is directed
by the microcode and sometimes by the macrocode; is that right?
A. In the sense that macroinstructions can directly control
hardware. In that sense, sometimes macroinstructions and
sometimes microinstructions are used for control.
[Tr. 2071:25-2072:10 (Kaneko)]
Q. In the computer microprocessor without microprogram-
ming, the control structure operates upon commands from the
macroinstruction, doesn't it?
A. There is no mistake in the fact that the macroinstructions
will be the trigger to the output, yes.
[Tr. 2070:11-13; 2071:11-13 (Kaneko)]
In sum, microcode cannot be excluded from the generic classi-
fication of computer programs simply because of its advantages of
1987]
8 COMPUTER & IIIGH-TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
ROM storage or increased efficiency of translation. In the instant
case, as the court ruled, the Intel microprograms are computer pro-
grams within the meaning of the Copyright Act and entitled to all
the protections extended to computer programs under the Act.
B. The Copyrightability of Microcode: As a Literary Work
Even without the explicit addition of the computer program
copyright protection amendment, microcode is entitled to copyright
protection as a literary work because the Copyright Act provides
protection for original works of authorship "expressed in words,
numbers, or other.., numerical symbols or indicia."7 Microcode
indeed can be written in words, numbers or other numerical sym-
bols. Citing to the Apple cases, the court agreed in its Partial Find-
ings that Intel's microprograms are "copyrightable literary works
expressed in words, numbers or other numerical symbols or
indicia."
The court's findings carry import far beyond this specific set of
Intel microprograms. This initial decision should bring some peace
of mind to the large segment of the industry which has invested
time, money and trust in developing microcode under the assump-
tion that copyright law would continue to protect its computer pro-
gram products.
The marking and infringement issues in the NEC-Intel dispute
are by nature far more fact-dependent than the copyrightability is-
sue. These issues are important to the protection of the 8086
microcode but they do not have the precedental value of the ruling
that microcode is copyrightable.
III. INTEL MAINTAINED THE VALIDITY OF ITS COPYRIGHT
NEC contended that, in the event microprograms were found
to be copyrightable, Intel had lost whatever copyrights it had.
Under the Copyright Act, the owner of a copyright is given certain
responsibilities as well as rights in the works. The owner must add
copyright notice to his work upon publication or, if this is inadver-
tently omitted, must make reasonable efforts to add notice to the
product in the chain of distribution.8 Failure to do so may result in
forfeiture of the owner's copyright protection.
NEC chose to attack Intel on precisely this issue: Whether In-
tel had properly marked its product with copyright notice and, if
7. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
8. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401, 405(a)(2).
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not, whether Intel had made reasonable efforts to correct any defi-
ciencies in its marking. Of all the issues at trial, this question was
the least specific to computer technology and involved a factual in-
vestigation tracing through various contracts and histories.
The court in the Partial Findings summarized the rather
lengthy history of Intel's and NEC's experiences with marking the
Intel microprograms as follows: Intel had "always marked with
copyright notice the 8086 products marketed and distributed di-
rectly by it ... [and at] all relevant times had a policy requiring
licensees of the 8086 product to mark with copyright notice."
However, not all of Intel's licensees had such a stellar record of
marking the products with copyright notice. Of Intel's twelve licen-
sees, nine had agreements containing express marking provisions.
As the court found, the fact that three licensees did not have ex-
press marking provisions was "the result of inadvertence and mis-
take, and not the result of a lack of policy or a deliberate non-
enforcement of policy."
NEC was one of the three licensees without the express mark-
ing provision. When Intel discovered that NEC, as well as the two
other licensees, was not marking its product, Intel not only sought
an immediate marking agreement but also audited all licensees. In-
tel also took the remedial step of sending several thousand copy-
right stickers to major distributors of NEC's products in the U.S.A.
Intel's vice president David House testified to these issues, asserting
Intel's policy to mark all 8086 products and describing Intel's ef-
forts to obtain marking by its licensees. As a result of Intel's efforts,
as the court noted in the Partial Findings, just one-tenth of Intel's
microprograms were distributed without marking. Furthermore,
Intel had also registered its microprograms within five years after
the "publication without notice" by its licensees. As a finding of
law, the court held that Intel's efforts to add notice to the unmarked
products had been reasonable and entitled Intel to be excused for
the omission pursuant to 17 U.S.C. Section 405(a)(2). In light of
the evidence that Intel itself had marked and had made reasonable
efforts to obtain marks for its licensees' products and had obtained
timely certificates of copyright registration, the court acknowledged
in the Partial Findings that the Intel microprograms were "pro-
tected by good and valid copyright which has not been forfeited."
The focus of the inquiry therefore shifted to ascertaining the degree
to which NEC infringed upon that copyright.
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IV. NEC's INFRINGEMENT OF INTEL'S MICROPROGRAM
COPYRIGHT
A. Direct Evidence of Copying
It was NEC's position at trial that even if microprograms were
copyrightable and Intel's copyrights were not forfeited, NEC's
microprograms did not infringe. Under the Copyright Act, the
owner of a copyright has the exclusive right to make copies or de-
rivative works from the copyrighted work.' Any person who vio-
lates this right is guilty of copyright infringement. 10 Infringement
of a copyright is established by direct evidence of copying."1 In a
recent case involving infringement of computer programs and au-
diovisual works, the district court found that direct evidence of
copying could be established by two factors: first, the use of in-
structions which did not make sense in the machine, and second,
evidence that the same programmer had both copied the copy-
righted program and "invented" his own similar program.12 Other
courts have held that copying of a computer program may be
proved by use of a similar code where it is less efficient, by creation
by someone with less experience than the original author of a simi-
lar work in less time, or by similarities in the structure and organi-
zation of the two programs.3
1. Common Errors in Both Programs
One indicator of copying is the existence of errors or unneces-
sary materials common to both works. 4 Errors are traditionally
evidence of copying because two people rarely create the same error
independently. Rather, errors are copied - usually by mistake.
Suspicions were raised in this area when Intel studied NEC's
microcode and found that unnecessary specifications appeared in
both the Intel and NEC microprograms.
As Intel's expert put it, ". . . You see everything else lines
up.... [T]his unnecessary operation was in Rev '0', just like the
[Intel code] 8086... I can't imagine why [the NEC programmer]
9. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(l)-(3).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
11. M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 445 (4th Cir. 1986).
12. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc. [slip op. C85-3457, October 8,
1986 (N.D. Cal. 1986)].
13. See, eg., E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1494 (D. Minn.
1985); SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 823 (M.D.
Tenn. 1985); Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307,
1322 (E.D. Pa 1985).
14. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp. at 1494.
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put something in which he knew he didn't need to do unless he
copied what the 8086 did."'15
2. Documentation
Copying may also be implied where there is inadequate docu-
mentation to prove independent creation. 16 The adequacy of the
documentation can be judged by comparing it to the documentation
available for similar projects. In this instance, there were very few
development notes maintained for the specific NEC microprograms
in issue as compared to the numerous notes showing development
of other microprograms by the same NEC programmer. Some of
the former notes in fact had copies of the original Intel
microprograms attached to the notes. Of the 88 NEC micro-
programs which interpreted 8086 macroinstructions, NEC pro-
duced development notes or records for fewer than 10.
3. Unusual Speed in Creating the Program
The NEC microprogram was created under unusual circum-
stances and with amazing speed. As one NEC programmer stated,
"I myself felt that I would not be able to meet the [development]
schedule." The primary programmer, Mr. Kaneko, testified that he
wrote the NEC code in one-half a man-month. Kaneko came to the
project with no academic training in microprogramming; his only
experience with microcode was disassembling the Intel microcode
for NEC. Kaneko was so inexperienced that he copied the format
of Intel's instructions because as he admitted, he "did not know of
any other microinstruction format that could be referred to in de-
termining the format. . ." In contrast, the original Intel
microprogram was written by an eight year veteran of program-
ming who spent over a month on the code, also working under a
very tight schedule. He testified concerning the need to write and
rewrite the code many times due to the complexity of the tasks and
the technology. Such testimony should be viewed in light of the
common law doctrine that copying may be inferred where there is
proof of the creation of a similar work in less time than the original
or by someone with less experience than the original author.17
4. Conduct Implying Copying
Finally, evidence of certain types of conduct can provide proof
15. [Tr. 237:1-9 (Patterson)).
16. SAS Institute, supra note 13, at 823.
17. Whelan, supra note 13 at 1322; SAS Institute, supra note 13, at 830.
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of copying. For instance, evidence of efforts to disguise copying was
accepted as proof of copying in SAS Institute.18 At least three as-
pects of NEC's conduct imply cover-up of copying.
NEC had demonstrated a pattern of copying. As described
above, NEC had copied the Intel microcode in an earlier situation.
More relevant here, however, was the fact that NEC planned to
copy again and began to program CMOS machine, called the
80C88, with Intel-based microprograms. As an NEC manager
testified:
Q .... Is it true that the NEC plan was to take the microcode
from the uPD 8088 and install it in the CMOS version?
A. Yes, that is a - that is true.
Q. In short, your testimony was and is that your plan was for
the CMOS version to be a bit-for-bit copy of the NMOS 8088; is
that correct?
A. To the extent of my understanding and to the extent of my
recollection, that is true.
[Tr. 2205:6-9; 2206:4-8 (Sasaki)]
When the first dispute arose over the copying of the 8086 and
8088 in the uPD 8086 and uPD 8088 (NEC's version), however,
NEC pulled its employees off the 80C88 project and assigned the
exact same group to a "completely new" project, the development
of the V20 and V30. This project evolved to produce the
microprogram at issue in the Intel-NEC trial. Yet testimony
showed that this supposed change of projects became little more
than a name change, at least insofar as the microcode was
concerned:
Q. You referred in your testimony to a product called the
80C88. Did that product later become the V20?
A. As I answered earlier, some people had called this product,
which was going to be named V20 later on, as 80C88 at certain
point in time during 1982.
[Depo. Tr. 64:6-10 (Kani)]
Q. Did you stop working on the 8088 simple CMOS version
during 1982?
A. I don't think stop is a right word to use.
18. SAS Institute, supra note 13, at 822-823; accord, M. Kramer Mfg., supra note 11, at
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Q. What happened to the effort that was being devoted to the
simple CMOS 8088 version?
A. It was, I think, useful for doing my work myself in develop-
ing V20 and V30.
[Depo. Tr. (Vol. I) 55:26-56:4 (Koike)]
Q. When, as far as you know, was work on the simple CMOS
version of the 8088 stopped?
A. I don't remember it accurately when the work for CMOS
version of 8088 stopped, but I think it was the latter part of 1982.
Q. Was that effort redirected to the V20, V30?
THE WITNESS: When you said the effort in your question, I
don't understand the exact content of the effort, but it is true that
the people who were working on CMOS version of 8088 worked
on V20 and V30.
[Depo. Tr. 51:10-15; 52:3-6 (Nohara)]
Secondly, NEC's microprogram is run on hardware which is
very similar to Intel's.
One NEC manager testified:
Q. The basic hardware, the basic architecture, that you are
starting with and adding a dual bus to, adding a loop counter
too, is basic 8086/8088?
A. I[t] used as a base the internal hardware of the 8088.
[Tr. 2282:18-22 (Iwasaki)]
A second NEC manager testified that he was aware of the risk
in copying Intel's hardware:
Q. ... Is it true that you told Dr. Kani that he needs to plan a
microprocessor with completely different architecture than the
8088/86?
A. Yes, it is exactly as stated.
[Tr. 2220:18-22 (Sasaki)]
Q. You understood at the time when you issued your instruc-
tion to Dr. Kani that if NEC used the same architecture as IN-
TEL used there was a substantial risk that the microcode would
be the same or similar as that used by INTEL. Isn't that right?
A. Yes, I did think that if the same architecture is used there
will be a high probability that the similarity, that there will be
similarity between the two, yes.
[Tr. 2222:1-9 (Sasaki)]
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Ironically, NEC does not gain full advantage from the addi-
tional hardware it did implement. As NEC's expert testified, NEC
lost the benefit of its augmented architecture because of the choices
made in the microprograms. For example, NEC's choice of entry
points in the microprograms results in a loss of efficiency; not coin-
cidentally, NEC's microprograms mimic most of the entry points in
Intel's microprograms.
Finally, NEC's behavior is suspect in that its witnesses cannot
outright deny copying the Intel microprograms. The same NEC
programmer who disassembled the Intel microprograms for one
project later specified the instructions for the NEC V20 and V30.
When questioned closely about whether he had copied any instruc-
tions from the disassembled Intel microprograms during the NEC
development period, he could not remember his actions:
Q. And from all the possibilities that you had to write reset,
you wrote a sequence that was almost identical to Intel's; didn't
you?
A. In terms of the end result, yes, it is something close.
Q. Mr. Kaneko, is there any possibility that while you were
generating the REV.O V20 reset sequence, you referred to the
disassembled code?
A. I also do not recall whether or not I looked at the character
string or strings at that time.
Q. Is there any possibility that while generating the REV.O se-
quence for XLAT, you referred to the disassembled code?
A. With respect to that also, during that particular time, I do
not recall whether I referred to the character string.
Q. My question in both instances was not whether you recall,
but whether there is a possibility that you referred to the code.
A. It is not [zero], no.
Q. In any event, as you explained yesterday, you knew you
weren't supposed to look at the disassembled code. Can you tell
us today, in all honesty, that you didn't do so?
A. I do not recall whether any reference had been made or not.
[Tr. 2150:11-23; 2151:5-18 (Kaneko)]
NEC's expert carefully refrained from learning exactly what
NEC's engineer Mr. Kaneko did when he wrote the micro-
programs:
Q. Are those similarities enough, Dr. Frieder, to suggest to you
the possibility that the Rev "0" code was copied from the disas-
sembled uPD 8086 code?
A. I don't know if it was copied.
[Vol. 3
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Q. I took your deposition on May 17, and at page 585, I asked
you this question and you gave this answer, lines 5 to 8:
QUESTION: Is this enough similarity to suggest to you that
there is a possibility that the right-hand column is copied from
the left-hand column?
ANSWER: Yes.
You would give that same answer today, would you sir?
A. Sure. I said I don't know. I don't know if it was copied.
Q. You don't for a moment suppose that Mr. Kaneko just
remembered the uPD 8086 code by heart, do you?
A. I don't know what Mr. Kaneko did.
[Tr. 1582:14-1583:10 (Frieder)]
Q ... I'm asking you whether or not that [Ex. AGT] doesn't
suggest to you, the expert investigator, the possibility that Mr.
Kaneko used his disassembled code to write that Rev. 0 version
of his INTSEQ sequence?
A. He may have, he may not have. I don't know.
[Tr. 1716:17-21 (Frieder)]
Q. In fact you weren't asked to decide or consider whether Mr.
Kaneko used the disassembled source code and you don't know
at all if he used it or not?
A. I don't know if he used it or not.
[Tr. 1803:1-4 (Frieder)]
Q .... Isn't is correct and fair to say that you really don't know
whether or not Mr. Kaneko copied sequences in the INTEL
microcode?
THE WITNESS: In all legal sense I don't know if Mr. Kaneko
copied.
[Tr. 1803:13-15; 1803:25-1804:1 (Frieder)]
B. Indirect Proof of Copying
Copying can be proved either by direct evidence or by indirect
evidence showing access and substantial similarity. As the federal
district court in Broderbund said: "In the interest of creating a
comprehensive record, the Court deems it desirable also to under-
take a circumstantial analysis of copying, i.e., a determination of
whether defendant had access to the copyrighted work and whether
there exists 'substantial similarity' between the copyrighted work
1987]
16 COMPUTER & IIGH-TECHNOLOGYL4W JOURNAL
and defendant's work." 19
Proof of access and substantial similarity is an established
means for demonstrating copying. The Ninth Circuit has stated:
"Copying is ordinarily established indirectly. The plaintiff demon-
strates that the defendant had access to the copyrighted items, and
that the defendant's product is substantially similar to plaintiffs'
work. Once this is done, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove
his work was not copied, but independently created."2
1. Access to Copyrighted Work
An admission of access is an important element when consider-
ing other proofs of copying. Where substantial similarity of the
works is offered as indirect proof of copying, an admission of access
will reduce the quantum of proof required.21 NEC had in fact cop-
ied Intel's microcode bit-for-bit for an earlier NEC machine, the
uPD, without any authorization from Intel and access to the copy-
righted work was not contested in this dispute.
2. Substantial Similarity
The traditional test for substantial similarity is whether the
work is recognized by an ordinary observer as having been taken
from the copyrighted work.22 This test has undergone some modifi-
cations in recent years. As the court pointed out in Broderbund, the
Ninth Circuit adopted a two-step test for determining substantial
similarity - an "extrinsic test" consisting of a side-by-side compar-
ison and expert testimony and an "intrinsic test" reflecting the ordi-
nary person's response. The district court in Broderbund believed
that a new test integrating both lay and expert testimony was the
"way of the future" (as shown by its use in the Third Circuit). In
Intel, the court was presented with all the elements necessary: ex-
pert testimony, expert side-by-side comparisons, and the materials
from which to draw a conclusion.
Many of NEC's microprograms, including several key se-
quences, are substantially similar to Intel's corresponding micro-
programs. Dr. David Patterson, Intel's computer expert, testified
that at least 54 out of the 88 sequences in NEC's code were substan-
19. Broderbund, supra note 12, at 16.
20. Kamar Int'l. Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 1981).
21. Sid & Marty Kroft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977).
22. Transgo, Inc. v. Ajax Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1018 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 802 (1986).
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tially similar. NEC's expert witness, Dr. Gideon Frieder, agreed
that "very many" were in fact very similar:
Q. ... Now, as I understand it, Dr. Frieder, you did not [sic]
note that there were some places where the V20 and V30 [and]
Intel code were identical. Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And there were some [places] that you noted where the
codes were very close, very similar, correct?
A. Yes.
I analyzed all of them. I analyzed all of them. I classified
all of them. I considered very many of them very similar, very
similar and completely constrained (emphasis supplied).
[Tr. 1728:13-19; 1733:13-16; 1788:2-7 (Frieder)]
The high degree of similarity between the Intel and NEC codes
is even more suspect when one considers that five years had passed
between the times that Intel and NEC had each written their
microprograms. In trial, Intel's programmer explained the effect of
this time difference: "In the five years between '77 and '82, the
semiconductor technology had advanced in many ways. The dies
could be safely manufactured physically bigger and transistors were
smaller and many more could fit on the die... In my opinion...
not only would the program itself have been different, but I would
have gone so far back up the change of the design, the design
change, that I certainly would have changed the language in which
the program was written ....
C. Was the Similarity in Microprograms Required?
Given that a great many similarities exist between Intel's and
NEC's microprograms, the issue becomes whether there was any
legal justification for these similarities. NEC argued that the simi-
larities were required due to the constraints on programming im-
posed by the hardware. Intel, in turn, questioned both NEC's
choice of hardware and whether the similarities must necessarily
exist even given the same hardware.
1. The Inapplicability of the Merger Doctrine
NEC's arguments in this area sought to lay a foundation for a
finding of merger. The merger doctrine states that copyright pro-
tection does not extend to works which encompass an idea which
23. [Tr. 464:25-465:15; 466:1-12 (McKevitt)].
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can only be expressed in one way. The idea and the expression are
in that instance "merged," and since copyright does not protect an
idea from being copied, but only the specific expression of the idea,
such works are not protected.
The courts have not readily applied the merger doctrine to
computer program cases, however, but have sought to determine
whether other variations on the suspect programs were possible. As
the Third Circuit stated, "If other programs can be written or cre-
ated which perform the same function as [this] operating system
program, then that program is an expression of the idea and hence
copyrightable."2 Another court has declared, "Even in the case of
simple statistical calculations, there is room for variation .. ."25
The Third Circuit has refined the statement: "When there are vari-
ous means of achieving the desired purpose, then the particular
means chosen is not necessary to the purpose; lhence, there is ex-
pression, not idea."26 Thus, in the NEC situation, the court must
determine whether there were other ways in which NEC could have
written microcode to direct the computer to perform certain in-
structions. It was Intel's position that NEC had many choices in
building a compatible microprocessor. NEC could have imple-
mented the 8086 instruction set entirely in hardware, could have
used both microprograms and hardware but selected different hard-
ware or could have written original microprograms.
a. NEC could have used different hardware
Although NEC argued that microcode similarities were re-
quired by the hardware and instruction set, Intel contended that the
similarity in hardware was a result of NEC's choice, not necessity.
As NEC's expert Dr. Gideon Frieder agreed, NEC could have
designed a microprocessor that executed the Intel instruction set
with microcode radically different from Intel's:
Q. Is it true that NEC could have designed a microprocessor
that executed the 8086 instruction set with radically different
microcode than that employed by Intel's 8086. That was entirely
possible, wasn't it?
A. Yes.
[Tr. 1523:19-23 (Frieder)]
24. Apple v. Franklin, supra note 5, at 1253.
25. SAS Institute, supra note 13, at 825.
26. Whelan, supra note 13, at 1323.
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Q. Last week, you recall that we agreed a microprogrammer
could design totally different hardware and totally different
microcode to implement and still be compatible with a given
macroinstruction set.
A. That is correct.
[Tr. 1633:11-20 (Frieder)]
NEC's primary programmer agreed this was true as well. Even
NEC's counsel stated in trial that "NEC has already acknowledged
that there were other hardwares that could have been used."
Intel's expert witness Dr. Patterson traced the path that NEC
probably followed in developing its microarchitecture. As he
explained:
Well, assuming that the 8086, you decided to be compatible with
the 8086 macroinstruction set, the first decision point is whether
you are going to implement the microprocessor all in hardware
or in a combination of hardware and microcodes .. .Now,
Mr.Kaneko testified that NEC adopted the Intel microinstruc-
tion format even though there was no necessity to do so. Also,
the microinstruction set is very similar to Intel's. . . . One of the
most important decisions in the design of microarchitecture is
how to decode macroinstructions. There are many ways to do
this... In 1977, [Intel's] Mr. McKevitt decided to use a match-
ing instruction decoder and, in 1982, [NEC's] Mr. Kaneko de-
cided also to use a matching instruction decoder, although that
wasn't necessary .... I think it would be fair to say that NEC
adopted the Intel microarchitecture.27
Dr. Patterson further testified that NEC could have used different
hardware, a different microinstruction format, a different microin-
struction set, a different decoder, a different ROM size, and still be
software compatible with the Intel 8086, as Intel itself did with two
later microprocessors, the 80286 and 80386. As he stated: "In my
view, it is that [NEC] started at the disassembled code, provided a
microarchitecture that would allow them to refer to this disassem-
bled code and copy the microprogram.28
b. NEC Could Have Designed Different Microcode
In addition to expert testimony that the Intel and NEC
microcode did not have to be, but in fact were, similar, experts for
both sides also demonstrated that several different microprograms
could be written as alternatives to the Intel microprograms, even if
27. [Tr. 2776:11-17; 2777:18-2778:13; 2778-23:2779:7; 2782:15-2783:4 (Patterson)].
28. [Tr. 2843:16-2844:10 (Patterson)].
19873
20 COMPUTER & HIGH-TECHNOLOGY L4WJOURNAIL
written for the same hardware elements common to Intel's and
NEC's microprocessors. Among the comparisons which demon-
strate that substantial similarity between the Intel and NEC
microprograms was the result of copying are the following:
(1) There are at least 90 ways to reorder the microinstructions to
accomplish the RESET function in the Intel microprocessors;
about one-fourth of those would operate faster than the original
written by Intel's microprogrammer. In the original NEC ver-
sion of the RESET sequence, the order is exactly the same as the
order chosen by Intel. Many ways were also demonstrated to
write the reset sequence for the NEC machine; at least a dozen of
the rewritten sequences were faster than the microprogram used
by NEC and there were many more that could have been used.
(2) Numerous ways were demonstrated to write the common in-
terrupt procedure. The NEC microprograms implementing in-
terrupts were substantially similar to the Intel microcode for
interrupts. One NEC sequence utilized a unique code appearing
in the Intel sequence - this was an Intel "patch" specifically
written to program around a hardware bug in the Intel machines.
NEC argues that once the hardware bug was copied, the patch
was the obvious way to program around the adopted bug.
(3) The NEC microcode utilizes 217 out of 288 entry points and
66 out of 76 instruction groupings used by the Intel code, thus
sacrificing improvement and speed which could otherwise have
been realized by the hardware changes in the NEC micro-
processor. As NEC's Kaneko testified, many different choices of
entry points and groupings were available to NEC.
c. The Merger Doctrine Does Not Apply
Such similarities cannot be rationalized as being the only way
to write the program or to express the idea behind the program. It
is not the idea behind the program which Intel seeks to protect, but
the programmer's individual expression of that idea. Here, as Dr.
Patterson testified, "the structure, organization and ordering of the
microinstructions in the Intel microprograms constituted the ex-
pression of the microprogrammer reflected in those micro-
programs and not merely the idea or function which inspired the
programs." The evidence demonstrated many possible modes of
expression.
V. NEC's "LAST DITCH" ARGUMENTS
All else failing (i.e., microprograms are copyrightable; Intel's
copyrights are preserved; NEC's microprograms are copies of In-
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tel's; and NEC was not constrained to copy) NEC argues two addi-
tional points. NEC contends that Intel licensed NEC for products
such as the V-series, and that Intel misused its copyrights.
The license argument has been fairly well disposed of by can-
did testimony from NEC's in-house counsel, Robert Hinckley:
Q. Well, your company and you have taken positions on that,
have you not, to the extent that the V-series is a new generation
of product and not covered, not subject to the '83 license. Isn't
that true?
A. Our position was that the V-series was, the microcode in the
V-series was independently developed and that the V-series, it-
self, is a proprietary microprocessor and, as such, does not re-
quire the license.
[Tr. 861:10-17 (Hinckley)]
Intel's response to the misuse arguments was testimony showing
that its suspicions of copying were well-founded. For instance,
Steven Domenik, an Intel engineer with some skill in the Japanese
language, testified to a conversation in Japanese between two NEC
employees:
Q. And did you have a discussion at that meeting concerning
the V20 and V30 products which you had been looking at?
A. Yes.
Q. And tell us as best you can recall, concerning that discus-
sion, what was said by Mr. Yamamoto and Mr. Suzuki?
A. We discussed the suspicion that I had arrived at... that the
microcode had been produced by copying ....
I raised that explanation of how one might do that by say-
ing: And I think that is how you copied the 8086 microcode.
Q. I want you to recite the conversation as you understand it
and the words used by Mr. Yamamoto and Mr. Suzuki.
THE WITNESS: I heard Mr. Yamamoto say 'so desu ka',
which I understood to mean, 'is it like that,' with reference to the
microcode.
Mr. Suzuki, by his facial expression, his general demeanor
and his answer in Japanese, which was 'so desu,' I interpreted his
acknowledgment that he had used roughly the procedure I had
outlined.
[Tr. 774:11-20; 774:25-775:2; 777:16-778:4 (Dominek)]
These issues, along with infringement, remain to be
adjudicated.
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V. CONCLUSION
This case is about the specific microprograms embedded in the
Intel 8086/8088 microprocessors. However, the issue of the
copyrightability of microcode has much broader implications. The
Court's partial decision that microcode is copyrightable has far
reaching implications to the computer industry in general. Today's
32-bit microprocessors require an investment of hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars to develop. The court's partial decision gives addi-
tional protection to these large research and development
investments because it is now clear that it is illegal to simply pirate
the microcode to quickly come to market with a competing prod-
uct. The decision puts potential copiers on notice that if they want
to compete with the Intel 80286, 80386, the National 32,000 or the
Motorola 68020, they must write their own microcode. The re-
maining issues are important to Intel with respect to the 8086
microprograms, but in the fast-paced semiconductor industry, these
products are already being overtaken by new offerings.
Nevertheless the unresolved infringement issue remains one of
the focal points of the trial. It is critical that the court not be per-
suaded that purported constraints allegedly imposed by NEC's
choice of hardware justify a decision to copy microcode. As Jack
Brown, counsel for Intel, summarized, "it is inconceivable that the
copyright law would allow a competing manufacturer to bootstrap
itself into a right to copy Intel's copyrighted microprograms simply
by adopting the microarchitecture or microinstruction format or al-
location of memory space."
To condone NEC's actions would invite a copier to disassem-
ble a machine and its code, construct similar architecture in his own
machine and then claim that, given that particular machine, he had
no choice but to use substantially similar microprograms. Creators
of original programs would find their copyrights completely cir-
cumvented. The incentive to produce microprograms would evapo-
rate, and with it, a valuable source of productivity.
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